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AN ANALYSIS AND CRITIQUE OF THE 1992 CHANGES TO
NEW ZEALAND'S ACCIDENT COMPENSATION
SCHEME*
RICHARD S. MILLER**
Because of alleged deficiencies in the tort system as a means of
dealing with personal injury accidents in the United States,' there
continues to be great interest in New Zealand's no-fault accident
compensation scheme as a possible alternative.2
The New Zealand scheme, first adopted in 1972, provided ben-
efits-without requiring any proof of fault-to persons suffering
"injury by accident." 3 These benefits included medical and rehabili-
tative expenses, compensation for eighty percent of lost earnings as
long as disability continued, and lump-sum payments of up to
$27,000(N.Z.) for non-economic losses, as well as other necessary
expenses.4 The most significant feature of the scheme, however,
was that where it provided "cover"-where a person suffered "in-
jury by accident"-the right to bring a civil action in tort for damages was
abolished.5
* This Article was originally written for volume 16, Number 4 of the Hiroshima
Law Journal in honor of the retirement of Professor Hiroyuki Hata, former Dean, from
the Hiroshima University Faculty of Law. It is printed here, with editorial adaptations,
with the permission of the Editors of the Hiroshima University Law Journal. It is based
upon a paper originally delivered at the Australian Law Teachers Association
Conference in Brisbane in July 1992.
** Professor of Law, The William S. Richardson School of Law, University of Ha-
waii at Manoa. B.S., J.D., Boston University; LL.M., Yale University.
1. See, e.g., STEPHEN D. SUGARMAN, DOING AWAY WITH PERSONAL INJURY LAW: NEW
COMPENSATION MECHANISM FOR VICTIMS, CONSUMERS, AND BUSINESS 1-72 (1989).
2. See, e.g., MASANOBU KATO, LIABILITY DAMAGES TO SOCIAL INSURANCE-COMPEN-
SATING PERSONAL INJURY VICTIMS (1989). Law students in the United States are rou-
tinely exposed to alternatives to tort law, including the New Zealand accident
compensation scheme. See, e.g., MARC A. FRANKLIN & ROBERT L. RABIN, TORT LAW AND
ALTERNATIVES- CASES AND MATERIALS 787-94 (5th ed. 1992); JAMES A. HENDERSON, JR.
& RICHARD N. PEARSON, THE TORTS PROCESS 899-910 (3d ed. 1988);JERRYJ. PHILLIPS ET
AL., TORT LAW--CASES, MATERIALS, PROBLEMS 1284-86 (1991).
3. Accident Compensation Act, 1982, No. 181, 1982 N.Z. Stat. 1552 [hereinafter
1982 Act] (consolidating and amending the 1972 Accident Compensation Act and its
amendments).
4. Id. Parts V-VII, 1982 N.Z. Stat. 1606-67. Dollar amounts are in New Zealand
dollars, which in April 1992 were exchangeable at about $.55(U.S.) apiece. Thus,
$27,000(N.Z.) is worth a little less than $15,000(U.S.).
5. Id. § 27(1), 1982 N.Z. Stat. 1573.
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The New Zealand scheme has been described by W.F. Birch,
New Zealand's Minister of Labour, as "one of the world's most ad-
vanced schemes for compensating the victims of accidents . . 6
But the current New Zealand government, a National rather than a
Labour government, has imposed what Minister Birch characterizes
as "the most radical reforms to the accident compensation scheme
since it first provided cover in 1974."' Most of these reforms took
effect when the Accident Rehabilitation and Compensation Act of
1992 went into force on July 1, 1992.8
It is the purpose of this paper to describe the more significant
changes made by the National government to New Zealand's acci-
dent compensation scheme and to analyze their likely effects. 9
First, however, it is important to note the clearly identifiable
change in the underlying philosophy of the accident compensation
scheme. Justice Owen Woodhouse, who may rightly be called the
Father of the New Zealand accident compensation scheme, identi-
fied the basic principle of the original program as community or col-
lective-as opposed to individual-responsibility.'" In his view, the
scheme reflected a concept of social insurance; it was not a private
insurance scheme."
By contrast, the present government considers the new Act to
be a scheme of accident insurance,12 including premiums to be paid by
individuals who will benefit under the program. This important
philosophical change is reflected in the title of the new Act, the Acci-
dent Rehabilitation and Compensation Insurance Act of 1992, and in
the new name of the former Accident Compensation Corporation,
the governmental body that operates the scheme: the Accident Re-
habilitation and Compensation Insurance Corporation. It is also re-
flected in another change of language: Charges against those who
must pay for the scheme, formally referred to as "levies," are now
6. W.F. BIRCH, ACCIDENT COMPENSATION: A FAIRER SCHEME i (1991).
7. Id. at 66.
8. Accident Rehabilitation and Compensation Insurance Act 1992, No. 13 [herein-
after 1992 Act].
9. For my description and views of the New Zealand scheme pior to the current
amendments, see Richard S. Miller, The Future of N'ew Zealand's Accident Compensation
Scheme, 11 U. HAW. L. REV. 1 (1989).
10. ROYAL COMMISSION OF INQUIRY, COMPENSATION FOR PERSONAL INJURY IN NEW
ZEALAND 40 (1967) [hereinafter THE WOODHOUSE REPORT]. The Commission was
chaired by Justice Woodhouse.
11. NEW ZEALAND LAW COMMISSION, PERSONAL INJURY: PREVENTION AND RECOVERY:
REPORT ON THE ACCIDENT COMPENSATION SCHEME 4-5 (1988) [hereinafter REPORT No.
4].
12. BIRCH, supra note 6, at 15.
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explicitly called "premiums."' 3
I. THE RIGHT TO BRING A COMMON-LAW ACTION
As in the prior law, the most important feature of the new Act is
that civil tort actions for compensatory damages for covered per-
sonal injuries are abolished.14 Importantly, however, as under the
1982 Act, a victim is not precluded from bringing a civil tort action
for damages with respect to injuries not covered by the scheme; 15
therefore, a rule or court decision of no coverage opens the door to
a possible claim for damages under the common law of torts.
II. COVERAGE
The prior Act covered "personal injury by accident,"' 6 which
was defined to include: "[t]he physical and mental consequences of
any such injury or of the accident"; 7 "[m]edical, surgical, dental, or
first aid misadventure,"' otherwise undefined; "[i]ncapacity result-
ing from an occupational disease or industrial deafness,"' 9 as more
specifically defined; 20 and "[a]ctual bodily harm (including preg-
nancy and mental or nervous shock)" arising from acts or omissions
that fit the description of certain sexual crimes. 2'
An important difference in the new Act is the apparent exclu-
sion of cover for mental distress not associated with physical injury
to the person seeking cover.22 This exclusion may result in denial of
cover of injuries from intentional or negligent infliction of emo-
tional distress.
Perhaps the most radical change to coverage is the extent to
which the Act now seeks to define coverage for harm caused by the
13. See 1992 Act, supra note 8, § 134. Section 134 reads, "Levies paid or payable
under the Accident Compensation Act 1982 shall be deemed to be premiums paid or
payable for the purposes of this Act."
14. Id. § 14.
15. Civil actions at law to recover punitive or exemplary damages for outrageous
conduct are still permitted. See Auckland City Council v. Blundell, [1986] 1 N.Z.L.R.
732, 739; Donselaar v. Donselaar, [1982] 1 N.Z.L.R. 97, 104-07.
16. 1982 Act, supra note 3, § 26(1), 1982 N.Z. Stat. 1577.
17. Id. § 2(1), 1982 N.Z. Stat. 1560.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. §§ 28, 29, 1982 N.Z. Stat. 1579-80.
21. Id. § 2(1), 1982 N.Z. Stat. 1560.
22. The new Act states that "[f[or the purposes of this Act, 'personal injury' means
the death of, or physical injuries to, a person, and any mental injury suffered by that
person which is an outcome of those physical injuries to that person .... 1992 Act, supra note 8,
§ 4(1) (emphasis added). See also id. § 8(3).
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acts or omissions of health care professionals. While the former Act
merely stated that personal injury by accident included "medical,
surgical, dental, or first aid misadventure," without further defini-
tion,23 the new Act includes a definition of medical misadventure
spanning nearly two pages.24 The result is that in cases in which
claimants seek compensation for "medical misadventure," proceed-
23. 1982 Act, supra note 3, § 2(1), 1982 N.Z. Stat. 1560.
24. The Act states:
(1) For the purposes of this Act,-
"Medical error" means the failure of a registered health professional to ob-
serve a standard of care and skill reasonably to be expected in the circum-
stances. It is not medical error solely because desired results are not achieved
or because subsequent events show that different decisions might have pro-
duced better results:
"Medical misadventure" means personal injury resulting from medical er-
ror or medical mishap:
"Medical mishap" means an adverse consequence of treatment by a regis-
tered health professional, properly given, if-
(a) The likelihood of the adverse consequence of the treatment occurring
is rare; and
(b) The adverse consequence of the treatment is severe.
(2) For the purposes of the definition of the term "medical mishap", the like-
lihood that treatment of the kind that occurred would have the adverse conse-
quence shall be rare only if the probability is that the adverse consequence
would not occur in more than 1 percent of cases where that treatment is given.
(3) Where the likelihood that an injury would occur is in the ordinary course
rare, but is not rare having regard to the circumstances of the particular person,
it shall not be medical mishap if the greater risk to the particular person in-
jured-
(a) Was known to that person; or
(b) In the case of a person who does not have legal capacity, was known
to that person's parent, legal guardian, or welfare guardian, as the case may be,
prior to the treatment.
(4) For the purposes of the definition of the term "medical mishap", the ad-
verse consequences of treatment are severe only if they result in death or
(a) Hospitalisation as an inpatient for more than 14 days; or
(b) Significant disability lasting for more than 28 days in total; or
(c) The person qualifying for an independence allowance under section
54 of this Act.
(5) Medical misadventure does not include personal injury arising from ab-
normal reaction of a patient or later complication arising from treatment proce-
dures unless medical misadventure occurred at the time of the procedure.
(6) A failure to obtain informed consent to treatment from the person on
whom the treatment is performed or that person's parent, legal guardian, or
welfare guardian, as the case may be, is medical misadventure only if the regis-
tered health professional acted negligently in failing to obtain informed
consent.
(7) Medical misadventure does not include a failure to diagnose correctly the
medical condition of any person or a failure to provide treatment unless that
failure is negligent.
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ings are likely to turn into actions to prove medical negligence or
malpractice.25
III. BENEFITS
A. Retention of Earnings-Related Compensation
Under the new Act, there have been significant changes in ben-
efits. Nonetheless, it should be noted that earnings-related compen-
sation, measured as eighty percent of lost earnings, remains in
place. 6 Further, as in the former Act, 2 7 the employer pays for the
first week of benefits if the injury is a work injury, 28 and the Accident
Corporation pays for all earners' injuries, on or off the job, after the
first week. 29 The maximum amount payable as compensation for
loss of earnings is $1,179(N.Z.)-about $650(U.S.)-per week.3 0
B. Elimination of Lump Sums for Non-Economic Losses
Perhaps the most important and controversial change-from
the viewpoint of employees and labor unions3 1-is the elimination
of lump-sum payments for non-economic losses. The 1982 Act al-
lowed lump-sum payments of up to $17,000 for permanent loss or
(8) Medical misadventure does not include any personal injury resulting from
the carrying out of any drug trial or clinical trial where the injured person has
agreed in writing to participate in the trial.
(9) In making any decision under this section the Corporation shall obtain
and have regard to independent advice in accordance with procedures pre-
scribed by regulations made under this Act.
(10) Where the Corporation considers that medical misadventure may be at-
tributable to negligence or an inappropriate action on the part of a registered
health professional it shall-
(a) Give the registered health professional a reasonable opportunity to
comment on the matter; and
(b) If satisfied that there may have been negligence or inappropriate
action-
report the circumstances to the appropriate body with a view to the institution
of disciplinary proceedings, and to any other body that may be appropriate.
1992 Act, supra note 8, § 5.
25. See infra text accompanying notes 101-113.
26. See 1992 Act, supra note 8, § 39(1) ("The weekly compensation for earnings pay-
able to an earner who is incapacitated as a result of personal injury . . . is 80 percent of
the earner's weekly earnings.").
27. 1982 Act, supra note 3, §§ 57(2)(a), 59(1), 1982 N.Z. Stat. 1619, 1622.
28. 1992 Act, supra note 8, § 38.
29. Id. § 39.
30. This maximum is subject to annual adjustments to reflect "movements in aver-
age weekly earnings." 1992 Act, supra note 8, §§ 48, 70.
31. Despite its obvious drawbacks to injured employees, this change was supported
by both the Law Commission and the Labour Party. See REPORT No. 4, supra note 11, at
21.
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impairment of bodily function,3 2 and lump-sum payments of up to
$10,000 for loss "of amenities or capacity for enjoying life, includ-
ing loss from disfigurement; and... [p]ain and suffering, including
nervous shock and neurosis."3 3 Together, these items constituted a
significant part of the cost of the accident compensation scheme. 4
The elimination of these non-economic losses moves the scheme
away from its historical roots as a substitute for the civil tort action.
C. Provision of an Independence Allowance
In place of lump sums for non-economic losses, the new Act
provides for an "independence allowance" based upon the degree
of the claimant's disability, commencing not earlier than thirteen
weeks after the injury for which it is paid.35 The allowance is $40
per week, paid quarterly, for a person with 100 percent disability, to
be scaled downward, in accordance with regulations to be promul-
gated, for those with lesser disability. 6 No allowance is paid to
those with less than ten percent disability. 7 Under this provision,
the degree of a person's disability must be reassessed at intervals of
not more than five years.3 8
The purpose of the independence allowance, in the language of
Minister of Labour Birch, is "to enable those injured to meet the
additional costs arising from a permanent disability during the re-
mainder of their li[ves]." 9 The relatively small amount provided is
designed "to cover miscellaneous expenses associated with disabil-
ity." 4 The payment is to be adjusted annually to reflect changes in
the Consumer Price Index.4 It cannot be converted to a lump
sum.
4 2
In addition to the independence allowance, additional expenses
and costs for care-for purchase or modification of motor vehicles,
modifying a residence, household help, childcare, and for wheel-
32. 1982 Act, supra note 3, § 78(1), 1982 N.Z. Stat. 1650-51.
33. Id. § 79(1), 1982 N.Z. Stat. 1652-53.
34. See REPORT No. 4, supra note 11, at xiv.
35. 1992 Act, supra note 8, § 54(1), (2).
36. Id. § 54 (3), (4).
37. See id. § 54(1) ("[E]very person who has cover under this Act is entitled to receive
an independence allowance where the person's personal injury has resulted in a degree
of disability of 10% or more.").
38. Id. § 54(11).
39. BIRCH, supra note 6, at 47.
40. Id. at 49.
41. 1992 Act, supra note 8, § 71.
42. See id. § 74(1) ("Except as provided in this section and section 54(3) of this Act,
the Corporation shall not pay any compensation, grant, or allowance in advance.").
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chairs and other necessary equipment or appliances-will be cov-
ered, as in the prior Act,4 s as part of the rehabilitation of the
accident victim.
4 4
D. Re-evaluation of the Permanence of Incapacity
An important change, at least from the perspectives of both
moral hazard and rehabilitation, is the elimination of the provision
in the former Act that prohibited reduction of the earnings-related
compensation of a person determined to be permanently incapaci-
tated.45 This provision was designed to encourage permanently dis-
abled workers to seek rehabilitation, though it may have led some
workers to feign permanent incapacity. Section 51 of the new Act
requires periodic reassessments at intervals of not less than six
months for individuals assessed at having a capacity for work of less
than eighty-five percent, unless the Accident Corporation "is satis-
fied that no purpose would be served by a further assessment
,,46
E. Earnings-Related Compensation Not Allowed as a Substitute for
Unemployment Compensation
Even more significant is a provision in the new law that pre-
vents the accident compensation scheme from being used, at least
after the first twelve months following the incapacity, as unemploy-
ment compensation.47 By virtue of section 59(2)48 of the former
Act, claimants who were able to return to work, though not neces-
sarily in their previous occupations, would continue to receive earn-
ings-related compensation if there was no "appropriate" work
available. In view of the serious recession in New Zealand, this pro-
vision evidently became very expensive: Minister Birch estimated
that it was costing $40 million annually in recent years.49 Under the
new Act, there is a grace period of twelve months after the incapac-
ity has started, but if at that time the worker is determined to have a
capacity for work of eighty-five percent or more, eligibility for earn-
ings-related compensation ceases, irrespective of whether suitable
43. See 1982 Act, supra note 3, § 37(3)(e)-(g), 1982 N.Z. Stat. 1592 (providing cover-
age for modifications to the home, purchase of wheelchair and other aids for daily living,
and purchase or modifications of motor vehicles).
44. 1992 Act, supra note 8, § 26 (titled "Social Rehabilitation").
45. 1982 Act, supra note 3, § 60(5), 1982 N.Z. Stat. 1627.
46. 1992 Act, supra note 8, § 51(4).
47. Id. § 49.
48. 1982 Act, supra note 3, § 59(2), as amended, 1985 N.Z. Stat. 321, 324.
49. BIRCH, supra note 6, at 43.
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employment opportunities are available.5"
F. Loss of Earning Capacity of Non-Earners
A feature of the prior Act that had been criticized was the treat-
ment of non-earners who became accident victims. 5 Children under
16 or in school or apprenticeship programs who were injured were
allowed minimal earnings-related compensation based in part on
lost earning capacity.5 2 But homemakers-including those who had
taken time off from their profession or outside occupation to raise a
family-and other non-earners were not entitled to earnings-related
compensation based on their lost earning capacity. The new Act
purports to deal with that problem by allowing certain persons to
pay premiums to purchase the right to receive compensation for lost
earning capacity in the event of an accident. 53
G. Medical and Health Benefits
One of the problems complained of under the prior Act was
that accident victims had access to expensive and often preferred
private hospitals and other private medical and surgical services not
available under the public health system to victims of illness.54 This
created an incentive for doctors and patients to classify illnesses as
accidents.55 Another problem was that patients who were charged
50. 1992 Act, supra note 8, § 49.
51. See Miller, supra note 9, at 8-9.
52. 1982 Act, supra note 3, §§ 62, 63, 1992 N.Z. Stat. 1630-34.
53. 1992 Act, supra note 8, § 45. The new provision, however, seems inadequate to
the task: First, it only applies to those who are or have been earners, id. § 45(1), who
have had 12 months of continuous employment, id. § 45(2)(a), and who make the elec-
tion while still employed or within a month after ceasing to be employed, id. § 45(2)(b).
Second, the amount to be treated as earnings must be specified, id. § 45(5), and that
amount may be "the weekly earnings of the person calculated under this Act as if the
incapacity of the person commenced more than 5 weeks before the date of the election"
or a lesser amount. Id. § 45(6). Third, compensation is payable under this provision for
a maximum of 5 years from the date of the incapacity, irrespective of how long the
incapacity actually continues. Id. § 45(8). And fourth, the amount of the premiums
charged is to be determined "with the objective of there being sufficient in any year to
meet the full costs of the compensation payable under this section in that year and fu-
ture years for any claims made under this section in respect of personal injury suffered
in that year and the costs of administration of this section in that year." Id. § 45(10). A
less generous provision can hardly be imagined. Certainly it offers little to compensate
an injured homemaker who earned professional competence by virtue of her education
but who was either working at an entry-level position when she elected to purchase the
protection or, under the highly restrictive requirements of this section, could not
purchase the protection at all.
54. Cf. BIRCH, supra note 6, at 55-56.
55. Id. at 55.
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little or nothing for their health care had little motivation or incen-
tive to keep costs low. 56
Recognizing these problems, the New Zealand government has
evidently inaugurated "user part charges" for publicly funded
health care and required, or intends to promulgate regulations to
require, accident victims to "pay user charges for pharmaceuticals,
laboratory diagnostic tests and some public hospital services on the
same basis as the sick," and also to require them to "pay the same
targeted user charges for general practitioner visits as the sick."157
With regard to private hospitals and other health care providers, the
Government evidently intends to increase beneficiaries' charges by
reducing the maximum that the Accident Corporation can pay.58
IV. FUNDING AND DETERRENCE
Apart from the change of label for philosophical purposes from
"levies" to "premiums, '"" there are some significant changes
wrought by the new Act both in the way that the scheme will be
funded and in the way that premiums will be allocated and adjusted
to internalize costs to those who cause accidents.
A. The Former Act
Under the former Act, levies on employers covered both work-
and nonwork-related accidents of earners, levies on motor vehicle
owners covered motor vehicle accidents, and general taxes cov-
ered accidents to non-earners. 60  Levies on employers varied
according to the past accident-cost-experience of the industrial
group into which each employer fell; levies on motor vehicle
owners varied according to the class of vehicle.6' While there
was authority under the former Act to engage in experience
rating by awarding bonuses and assessing penalties to individual
employers,6" this authority was not being exercised.6" Statu-
tory authority to impose levies on motor vehicle drivers and to
impose penalties for poor driving records64 was also never
56. Id.
57. Id. at 56.
58. Id.
59. See supra text accompanying note 13.
60. See ACC Levies Due for Payment by 31 M"ay 1989-Employers, 7 February 1990--Self-
Employed, ACCIDENT COMP. CORP., Jan. 1989, at 5-6.
61. Id.
62. 1982 Act, supra note 3, § 40, 1982 N.Z. Stat. 1593-94.
63. See REPORT No. 4, supra note 11, at 39.
64. 1992 Act, supra note 8, § 49(d), 1982 N.Z. Stat. 1604.
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exercised.6"
B. The New Act
1. Work Injuries.-Under the new Act, employers pay premi-
ums, again adjusted by industry class,66 into an employer account
that covers only work injuries and certain industrial diseases, not
including work-related motor vehicle injuries.6 7
2. Earners' Nonwork Injuries.-One of the most controversial
features of the 1992 Act is the removal from employers of the obli-
gation to fund employees' nonwork injuries, and the imposition on
employees of the obligation to pay for insurance against such
injuries."
The initial premium for non-earners is 70 cents per $100 of
earnings.69 The new Act requires employers to withhold premiums
from employees' wages and pay them into the Earners' Account.7 °
3. Non-earners'Injuries.-Apart from a new section that permits
some non-earners to pay premiums for protection against loss of
earning capacity, 7' benefits for non-earners who are injured other
than in motor vehicle accidents will continue to be funded by gen-
eral tax revenues.72
4. Motor Vehicle Accident Injuries.-The costs of motor vehicle
accidents will continue to be borne-at least in part-by motor vehi-
65. Although recognizing the possible deterrent advantages of experience rating,
the Law Commission ultimately concluded that experience rating and penalties and bo-
nuses could not fairly or effectively be imposed. See REPORT No. 4, supra note 11, at 36-
40.
66. 1992 Act, supra note 8, § 103.
67. Id. §§ 100, 101. A unique feature of the new Act with regard to employees' work
injuries is that an employer may apply for the status of "exempt employer." d. §§ 105-
07. If the status is granted by the Accident Rehabilitation and Compensation Insurance
Corporation, the exempt employer becomes, in effect, a self-insurer with regard to its
employees' work injuries for a 12-month period following each such injury. Id. § 106(1).
One year following the injury, the Accident Corporation assumes the obligation with
respect to that employee. Id. § 106(2). The reward to an employer for becoming an
exempt employer is to have its premium reduced to reflect the cost saving to the Acci-
dent Corporation. Id. § 106(3). The status of exempt employer may only be granted for
one year at a time. Id. § 105(1), (2).
68. Id. §§ 113-16.
69. BIRCH, supra note 6, at 25. The plan was to impose a premium between 50 and
70 cents. The author has been informed that the premium has been set at 70 cents per
$100 of earnings.
70. See 1992 Act, supra note 8, § 115.
71. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
72. See 1992 Act, supra note 8, § 120.
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cle owners, through premiums to be paid in conjunction with the
annual registration and licensing of vehicles. 7' There is, however,
an interesting innovation: in order "to assist with public health
costs of injuries arising from motor vehicle accidents,"-74 the govern-
ment increased the tax on "motor spirit ' 75 by two cents per liter
and is obligated to pay this amount to the Accident Corporation an-
nually for the benefit of the Motor Vehicle Account. 76 The avowed
purpose of this charge is to "alert individual drivers to the real costs
of accidents, especially public health costs."
77
5. Medical Misadventure Injuries.-In the former Act, health pro-
fessionals were treated no differently from other self-employed per-
sons, occupations, or businesses: their levies were based upon their
industry class, which, in turn, was charged in accordance with the
injury experience of persons working in that industry.78 In short, premi-
ums were not based on the accidental harm the professional caused
to patients, but on the injury experience of the professional and the
professional's employees with regard to their own accidental injuries.
In consequence, levies to health professionals-who are in a rela-
tively nondangerous profession-tended to be relatively low.
7 9
The 1992 Act, however, creates a new account known as the
Medical Misadventure Account.80 Its purpose is to finance benefits
required to be paid under the new Act to victims of what may be
deemed medical malpractice.8" Premiums are to be set by classes of
certified health professionals as established by regulations.
8 2
Classes may include different fields of specialization, as well as dif-
ferent categories of health professionals.83 Funds to pay benefits to
victims of medical misadventure are to be derived from "[a]ny pre-
miums that may be payable by registered health professionals of the
same class as the registered health professional responsible for the
73. See id. § 110.
74. BIRCH, supra note 6, at 27.
75. Presumably this includes gasoline and other motor vehicle fuels. See generally
1992 Act, supra note 8, § 109.
76. See id. § 109(l),(4).
77. BIRCH, supra note 6, at 27.
78. See generally 1982 Act, supra note 3, §§ 38-44, 1982 N.Z. Stat. 1592-99.
79. Thus, for example, the levy that was due on February 7, 1990, for those in the
practice of medicine, was $1.35 per $100 of payroll. By way of comparison, the levy for
someone in the milk distribution business was $2.75, in the millinery retailing business
$1.65, and in the scrap metal business $11.00. See ACC Levies, supra note 60, at 37.
80. See 1992 Act, supra note 8, § 122-24.
81. See id. § 122(1).
82. See id. § 123(5).
83. See id.
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medical misadventure. ' 84
The upshot is that, for the first time since the advent of its acci-
dent compensation scheme, New Zealand has created a system of
economic accountability to third persons-where one class of in-
jury-causers will be charged for the costs of injuries not just to that
class's employees but to other persons whom that class has
injured.8 5
6. Experience Rating and Internalizing Costs.-The new Act pro-
vides for "experience rating," which may result in "no-claims bo-
nuses, increased premiums, or claim thresholds." 6 Experience
rating is applicable to all those from whom premiums are to be col-
lected-employers (including self-employeds), motor vehicle own-
ers, earners, and persons liable to pay medical misadventure
premiums.
With regard to premiums on employers, the New Zealand gov-
ernment apparently felt that experience rating would overcome the
"problems of broad industry classifications" and regarded "[t]he in-
troduction of experience rating [to be] an essential part of the
change in emphasis towards an insurance scheme funded by
premiums."a8
Apart from the fairness that might be associated with experi-
ence rating, however, there is some indication that the Government
was also concerned with deterrence of accidents. Thus, for exam-
84. Id. § 122(l)(a). Subsection (b) provides that the funds shall be derived:
"[w]here there is no such premium, from the Earners' Account (in the case of an earner)
or the Non-Earners' Account (in the case of a non-earner)." Id. § 122(l)(b). Presuma-
bly this subsection will apply when there is no class specified for a particular certified
health professional and therefore no special premiums collected from members of that
class.
85. It is interesting to note that the concept of a special medical misadventure fund
was not specifically mentioned by Mr. Birch, the Minister of Labour responsible for the
accident compensation scheme, in 1991 when he promulgated his report on the future
of the scheme. See BIRCH, supra note 6. He did note, however, that "[t]here has been
criticism of the scheme arising from the inadequacy of alternative means of calling medi-
cal practitioners to account for alleged negligence. There will be no return to the right
to sue; instead, the Government will introduce legislation to effect changes in discipli-
nary procedures for the medical profession." Id. at 31.
86. 1992 Act, supra note 8, §§ 104, 111, 116, & 124.
87. See id. While the language providing for experience rating of earners, self-em-
ployeds, motor vehicle owners, and health professionals appears to be discretionary-
using the word "may"-the section dealing with experience rating of individual employ-
ers "on the basis of the actual costs of work injuries that occur in the employment of that
employer" seems to be mandatory-using the word "shall." Compare 1992 Act, supra
note 8, § 111, 116& 124 with id. § 104.
88. BIRCH, supra note 6, at 24.
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pie, with regard to the assessment of a motor vehicle fuel tax, Minis-
ter Birch stated:
While impacting on all road users, this premium is ex-
pected to have a particular impact on young drivers, espe-
cially 16- to 24-year-old males. This group has a
particularly high accident rate and therefore has a dispro-
portionate effect on public health costs. They often drive
vehicles owned by others, such as their parents, and this
additional premium will impact on them directly when they
purchase petrol.8 9
V. CRITIQUE
At an international workshop entitled "Beyond Compensation:
Dealing With Accidents in the 21 st Century,"90 former Prime Minis-
ter Geoffrey Palmer, who was heavily involved with Justice Wood-
house in the development of the original New Zealand scheme,9'
suggested that the new Act "hasn't got any coherent thinking in it at
all. It is really unprincipled mishmash.... 9 Is that a fair reading
of the new Act?
It should be understood that the former Act was seen by its
framers as just a way-station on the road to a perfect collective or
welfare approach to disability.93 That the scheme did not purport to
cover incapacity by reason of illness was, in their view, only a tempo-
rary problem based on expediency, to be righted as soon as practi-
cable. The recent election of the National Party, however,
prevented the Labour government from taking this ultimate step, or
at least a step toward a more comprehensive plan, in the form of a
bill covering incapacity by reason of illness.
Quite clearly, the new Act is not viewed by its sponsors as a
social insurance scheme, but as a scheme providing comprehensive
accident insurance. From this perspective, therefore, the retention
from the 1982 Act of tax-funded benefits for non-earners is clearly
anomalous, since those benefits are only consistent with a welfare
89. Id. at 27.
90. Beyond Compensation: Dealing with Accidents in the 21st Century, East-West
Center, Honolulu, Hawaii (Mar. 22-24, 1992) [hereinafter Beyond Compensation]. The
proceedings have been accepted for publication in the University of Hawaii Law Review.
91. See generally GEOFFREY PALMER, ACCIDENT COMPENSATION: A STUDY OF LAW AND
SOCIAL CHANGE IN NEW ZEALAND AND AUSTRALIA (1979).
92. Beyond Compensation, supra note 90, Volume 2, at 26 (unpublished proceedings
of Mar. 23, 1992).
93. See THE WOODHOUSE REPORT, supra note 10, at 26; REPORT No. 4, supra note 1i,
at 7-10.
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scheme. The retention of these benefits, however, is not too drastic
a deviation from the new philosophy because the benefits paid to
non-earners, even including the new $40(N.Z.) per week indepen-
dence allowance, do not include much if anything by way of disabil-
ity income and undoubtedly only constitute, as they always have, a
relatively small part of the scheme. Indeed, the poor treatment of
non-earners, especially after depriving them of their civil actions for
personal injuries, seems to constitute a serious area of injustice in
the New Zealand scheme generally. Unfortunately, that has not
changed very much under the new Act.
It does appear that the scheme, although outlined in a single
statute, now embodies five distinctive schemes of compensation:
First, as just described, a modest welfare scheme for injured
non-earners.
Second, a fairly classical workers' compensation scheme covering
accidents and industrial diseases arising out of and in the course of
employment and funded almost entirely by employers. While the
scheme is rather generous in terms of earnings-related compensa-
tion, it will henceforth require injured employees to pay user-costs
in order to get some of their health benefits.94 This is less generous
than most workers' compensation schemes in the United States,
which usually cover all medical and rehabilitative expenses.
95
The new "exempt employer" provision 6 seems similar, but not
as far-reaching, as permission under most workers' compensation
acts for qualified employers to self-insure or, at least, for employers
to purchase insurance from private insurers.
Viewed in isolation as a separate system, therefore, there is
nothing very exceptional about the provisions for compensation to
earners for work injuries.
Third, the provisions dealing with compensation and premiums
for earners' nonwork injuries constitute a first-party accident insur-
ance scheme. 97 This scheme differs from private schemes in that (1)
it is mandated by the Government; (2) the coverage is relatively
comprehensive, including disability income, health and other bene-
fits, rather than just lump sums or just disability income; and (3) a
government corporation stands in for the private insurers who
94. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
95. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. §§ 9-660, 9-670 to -675 (1991) (covering
not only medical and rehabilitative expenses, but also the cost of vocational rehabilitation
in certain circumstances).
96. See 1992 Act, supra note 8, §§ 105-07 (covering exempt employers).
97. See id. § 38(5)(b).
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might otherwise offer such insurance.98
Fourth, the scheme with regard to motor vehicle accidents9 9
constitutes a total no-fault motor vehicle accident program. Pre-
sumably, it too will be fully funded-including public health costs-
by user charges, that is, the premiums to be paid by owners and the
fuel tax to be paid by drivers and owners who purchase the fuel.
Fifth, the new provisions dealing with medical misadventure 0 °
seem to establish a quasi-medical-malpractice action. Under the for-
mer Act it was necessary for the claimant to establish "medical, sur-
gical, dental, or first aid misadventure," ' ' 1 which was not otherwise
defined in the Act. As Margaret Vennell described, there has been
considerable difficulty in determining what kind of acts, omissions,
or other medically related misfortunes constitute medical misadven-
ture. 1 2 While judges have increasingly deemed proof of medical
error amounting to a breach of the appropriate standard of care to
be relevant to the question of medical misadventure in both omis-
sion-to-act10 3 and other cases,' 0 4 such proof was not relevant in
every case.' 0 5 It also remained at least theoretically possible to de-
fine medical misadventure in all cases in a way that focused on the
accidental nature of the injury to the victim rather than on the fault
of the medical professional.
Under the new Act, however, a fault requirement has been ex-
pressly inserted into the framework of the accident compensation
system. With the exception of those who claim "medical mishap,"
98. There is evidently an intention on the part of the government, however, to give
further consideration to a greater role for private insurers. See BIRCH, supra note 6, at
61. Further, it might be possible, although the issue has evidently not been addressed,
to permit an employer to become exempt and "self-insure" by purchasing insurance
from a private carrier. See 1992 Act, supra note 8, §§ 105-06.
99. See 1992 Act, supra note 8, §§ 108-12.
100. See, e.g., id. §§ 5, 122-24.
101. 1982 Act, supra note 3, § 2(1), 1982 N.Z. Stat. 1560.
102. Margaret A. McGregor Vennell, Medical Injury Compensation Under the New
Zealand Accident Compensation Scheme and Medical Responsibility 7-22 (1992) (un-
published monograph). Professor Vennell, in addition to teaching law at the University
of Auckland, also served as a member of the board of the former Accident Compensa-
tion Corporation.
103. Id. at 13-16.
104. Id. at 20-21 (discussing, inter alia, New Zealand cases involving: a failure to treat
with appropriate antibiotics; continued prescription of a dangerous drug to an alcoholic;
failure to warn of the risk of failure of a sterilization operation; and failure of a vasec-
tomy operation and failure to warn of dangers of unprotected intercourse).
105. See, e.g., id. at 19 (describing an unreported New Zealand case holding that "a
misdiagnosis of an 'extensive carcinoma' followed by the unnecessary removal of the
entire stomach, distal oseophagus [sic], spleen and distal half of the pancreas," although
not negligent, constituted medical misadventure).
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which, as restrictively defined in the Act,"°6 is likely to constitute a
small minority of claims, all other medical misadventure claimants,
to prevail, must establish "medical error,"' 1 7 which essentially re-
quires proof of negligence-that is, malpractice.
In addition to provisions requiring proof of medical negligence,
there are other new provisions that give the medical professional an
opportunity to be heard,10 8 require that the Accident Corporation
have expert advice,'0 9 require findings of medical negligence or
other inappropriate action to be reported to a disciplinary or other
body," 0 call for experience rating of premiums paid by health pro-
fessionals, "' and permit claimants and health professionals dissatis-
fied with a decision of the Accident Corporation to request a review
of the decision and to appeal the decision of the reviewer through
the courts." t2 Taken together, these new provisions are likely to
create a highly adversarial proceeding or series of proceedings in
106. For the new Act's definition of "medical mishap," see supra note 24.
107. See supra note 24. Section 5(1) of the new Act defines medical error as "the fail-
ure of a registered health professional to observe a standard of care and skill reasonably
to be expected in the circumstances. It is not medical error solely because desired re-
sults are not achieved or because subsequent events show that different decisions might
have produced better results." 1992 Act, supra note 8, § 5(1). Section 5(6) of the new
Act disallows claims for failure to obtain informed consent unless "the registered health
professional acted negligently in failing to obtain informed consent." Section 5(7) disal-
lows claims for injury based on failure to diagnose the medical condition correctly or
failure to provide treatment "unless the failure is negligent." Since personal injury
caused by accident is a separate ground for coverage, a patient who suffers injury during
treatment may not have to establish medical misadventure if she can show that she suf-
fered injury caused by accident, see id. § 8(2)(a), or personal injury that was a conse-
quence of treatment for personal injury, id. § 8(2)(d). Presumably, injury by accident
can be established without proof of medical misadventure, for example, by proving that
the patient suffered injury when a surgical instrument broke while within her body cav-
ity. Cf. Anderson v. Somberg, 338 A.2d 1 (N.J.) (involving an operation in which the tip
of an angulated pituitary rongeur broke off while the tool was being manipulated in
plaintiff's spinal canal), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 929 (1975). That situation, however, may
also qualify as a "medical mishap."
108. 1992 Act, supra note 8, § 5(10)(a).
109. Id. § 5(9).
110. Id. § 5(10)(b).
111. Id. § 124.
112. Id. § 89(3) (providing that a registered health professional dissatisfied with a de-
cision under § 5(7) involving negligent failure to diagnose an illness or provide treat-
ment, or a decision under § 5(6) involving negligent failure to obtain informed consent,
may apply to the Accident Corporation for a review of the decision); see also id. § 90(4)(c)
(allowing the registered health professional who applies for review "to be present and
be heard either personally or by a representative"). The situations referred to in
§ 89(3), however, seem to exclude many, indeed probably most, other possible cases of
medical error where negligence in treatment occurs. See id. § 5(1). Section 91 allows
any person permitted to apply for review under § 89(3) to appeal to a District Court. See
id. Section 97 permits an appeal of that decision to the High Court. See id. § 97. Ques-
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which the issue is whether the tort of medical negligence has been
committed!
This development, in turn, raises serious questions about the
difficulties, costs, and delays a claimant will be likely to experience
in seeking compensation for medical error. First, as Professor Ven-
nell has noted, "[t]here is a possible danger that if the Accident
Compensation Corporation becomes involved in the complaint pro-
cedure that injured patients will be disadvantaged."' '" In a medical
community as small as New Zealand's," 4 it may be difficult to find
expert witnesses to testify on a claimant's behalf. Second, there is a
problem of affordability of legal costs. Although wrongful conduct
or omissions on the part of the health professional will have to be
established as in a medical malpractice action, the awards are not
likely to come close to matching the large damages available in a
conventional tort action for malpractice. Claimants ineligible for
legal aid may find legal representation excessively expensive and
may in any event not find the benefits worth the anguish of pressing
the claim.
Finally, there is the problem of delays. Those claiming medical
error-who might receive significant benefits if their claims are ap-
proved-may have to wait for extended periods while their claims
wend their way through the courts. From the point of view of com-
pensation to accident victims, therefore, the medical misadventure
provisions leave much to be desired. One is tempted to characterize
the new medical misadventure scheme as an unnatural union of fault
and no-fault, grossly unfair to many victims of medical error.
There is, however, a potentially positive aspect to the new Act:
the attempt to reassert accountability through experience rating. It
has been my view that the former Act significantly undermined de-
terrence of accidents by externalizing accident costs and by elimi-
nating from public consciousness the concept of negligence or fault
with regard to personal injuries." 5 Under the 1992 Act, experience
rating is mandatory for work injuries and may be inaugurated for all
other categories where premiums are required.' 16 This change re-
flects an intent to internalize the costs of accidents, and that intent is
tions of law may then be appealed to the Court of Appeal on leave of the High Court or
the Court of Appeal. See id. § 98.
113. Vennell, supra note 102, at 24. See also Walter Gellhorn, .Iedical Mlalpractice Litiga-
tion (U.S.) - Medical Mishap Compensation (N.Z.), 73 CORNELL L. REV. 170, 197-202 (1988).
114. See Gellhorn, supra note 113, at 197-98 & n.79.
115. See Miller, supra note 9, at 78-80.
116. See supra note 87.
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praiseworthy. Unfortunately, there may be insurmountable difficul-
ties in attempting fairly to "experience rate" individual New Zea-
land employers," 17 and even greater problems may arise with regard
to the experience rating of individual earners. On the other hand,
as is the case with motorists in the United States, premiums might
profitably be increased for those motor vehicle owners whose vehi-
cles have been involved in the violation of traffic laws.
With regard to medical misadventure, to the extent that find-
ings of negligence are now required for recovery in cases of medical
misadventure, experience rating of health professionals may be
fairly imposed."' Such increased premiums could serve to deter
health-provider negligence. It is unfortunate, however, that the na-
ture of the new system, as described above, will discourage medical
misadventure claims, even justified ones. Increases in premiums,
therefore, are not likely to come close to matching the actual costs
of medical error.
It has been my view, set forth in my 1989 article,' 9 that the best
way to reintroduce deterrence into the New Zealand system would
be to allow the corporation administering the system and the claim-
ant to bring tort actions against persons who caused the injuries for
which compensation is granted. If my approach were adopted, the
Accident Corporation would seek to recover from tortfeasors,
through subrogation, the value of benefits awarded under the Act;
the individual could seek to recover tort damages not compensated
by the Corporation. In the event of settlement, the Accident Corpo-
ration's claims would be primary.'2 0 Even though the new Act has
reintroduced tort-like considerations in the area of medical injuries,
and even though some provisions of the Act denying coverage may
117. See New Zealand Law Commission, Comment on "'The Future of AVew Zealand's Acci-
dent Compensation Scheme" by Richard S. Miller, 12 U. HAW. L. REV. 339, 341 (1990); RE-
PORT No. 4, supra note 11, at 36-40.
118. Experience rating would be fair if the medical professional whose premium is
increased because of negligence is actually given a reasonable opportunity to be heard.
That would include the right to be represented by counsel, to testify, to present wit-
nesses, and to participate fully through counsel on appeals. That is probably the case
under the new Act: Section 90(4)(a) allows any person dissatisfied with a premium as-
sessment, who seeks review as permitted in § 89(4), to be present and to be heard per-
sonally or by a representative. 1992 Act, supra note 8, § 90(4)(a). As with applications
for review under § 89(3), decisions on review under § 89(4) may be appealed to a Dis-
trict Court, the High Court, and-with leave-to the Court of Appeal. See supra note
112.
119. See Miller, supra note 9, at 63-73.
120. See id. (discussing this approach in more detail).
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reopen the door to full-scale tort actions that courts will allow,' 2'
the New Zealand government clings to the view that it is not reintro-
ducing the tort system.' 22
VI. CONCLUSIONS
A. Fairness
The New Zealand accident compensation scheme continues to
exhibit serious unfairness to non-earners. Neither the new indepen-
dence allowance nor the election to purchase benefits for loss of
earning capacity seem adequately to compensate non-earners who
lose significant future earning capacity by reason of accident. This
unfairness, as is often the case, will adversely affect women who are
raising children or working at low-paying jobs, or both, at the time
they suffer their accidental harm. There is also serious unfairness to
claimants seeking compensation for medical error, by virtue of the
hurdles they must clear and the costs they may have to incur before
their entitlement to compensation is established.
There is other evidence of unfairness: before the original
scheme was adopted, employers were not only liable for workers'
compensation but were also subject to tort actions brought by their
employees and most importantly, to personal injury actions, such as
products liability actions, brought by non-employees. A significant
trade-off was encompassed in the original scheme. In exchange for
immunity from tort actions brought by workers and others, employ-
ers would cover their workers for nonwork-related as well as work-
related accidents. Further, accident victims gave up their common-
law right to recover for pain and suffering, in exchange for the avail-
ability of lump-sum payments, although limited in amount. Under
the new Act, however, the employee has been deprived of both the
lump-sum payment and the employer's payment to cover nonwork
accidents. These benefits have been replaced only by an insignifi-
121. Recall that tort actions are disallowed only in situations where the Act provides
coverage. There are situations where coverage is not provided where the courts may
well allow tort recovery, such as claims for mental distress unaccompanied by physical
injury, see 1992 Act, supra note 8, §§ 4(1), 8(3), or for negligence or intentional wrongs
involved in drug or clinical trials in which the claimant had agreed in writing to partici-
pate. Id. § 5(8).
122. BIRCH, supra note 6, at 1. It is interesting to note that the Act expressly provides
for rights of subrogation for the Accident Corporation in those few cases where the
accident victim retains a right of action at law. See 1992 Act, supra note 8, § 15. It would
be relatively easy to require general subrogation simply by expanding this section of the
Act and amending section 14, which bars tort actions for damages with respect to per-
sonal injury for which the Act provides coverage.
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cant independence allowance of up to $40(N.Z.) per week. On the
other hand, employers remain exempt from both worker lawsuits
and personal injury actions brought by others.
To state the dilemma more starkly, while benefits paid by em-
ployers have been significantly reduced, employers remain immune
from product liability and other tort actions arising out of personal
injuries to third persons. In effect, the costs of accidents negligently
caused by manufacturing companies, agricultural producers, service
companies, landlords, nonhealth professionals and other employ-
ers, are being subsidized both by accident victims and by workers
who now pay individual premiums. This subsidy is in addition to
the subsidy already provided to New Zealand employers by their im-
munity from personal injury tort liability. From a global perspec-
tive, New Zealand producers who participate in international
markets will further increase their competitive advantage against
firms from nations that allow liability claims by injured persons.
B. Philosophy
It is true that no clear philosophy supports the five compensa-
tion systems encompassed by the new Act. Using the five "models
for the management of risk and its consequences" suggested by Ste-
phen Sugarman,' 2 3 the non-earner provisions are still based on col-
lective welfare notions, but the rejection of equal coverage for
illness-caused disability is anticollectivist and illiberal. The workers'
compensation feature, financed by employers, fits the liberal model.
The compulsory nonwork injury accident insurance scheme for
workers is a curious hybrid: authoritarian in its mandatory feature
and collectivist in its administration by a state-run corporation, but
conservative-if not libertarian-in having workers cover the costs
through premiums. The quasi-fault-based medical misadventure
scheme begins to move in a conservative direction by requiring
proof of fault in most cases and possibly by imposing the costs of
medical error on health care providers through experience rating,
but it is liberal to the extent that claims are initially handled admin-
istratively, that medical mishap is not based on fault, and that com-
pensation is limited. Similarly, the proposal to experience rate the
premiums for the entire system and to require payment of user
charges for medical and hospital benefits constitutes a further dis-
tancing from a collectivist welfare scheme. From this perspective,
123. The models are libertarian, conservative, liberal, collective, and socialist. See Be-
yond Compensation, supra note 90.
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therefore, the new Act does, indeed, seem to constitute an unprinci-
pled mishmash.
There is, however, evidence of an overarching anticollectivist
theme, perhaps prompted by New Zealand's dismal economic situa-
tion: with the glaring exception of non-earner accidents, the Acci-
dent Compensation System-and the Public Health System to the
extent that it serves accident victims-are to be increasingly fi-
nanced by premiums, user charges, and motor fuel taxes paid by
individuals and firms, rather than by general taxation. This trend is
in direct conflict with the preferences of the Law Commission and
the Labour government and clearly reflects a departure from the
principle of community or collective responsibility that guided the
former scheme.
C. Accident Policy
From a policy perspective, however, applying political labels is
not nearly as significant as the extent to which the new scheme
serves or disserves important values. In the case of an accident
compensation scheme, well-being is clearly the primary value. Well-
being may be served in two ways: (1) by compensating accident vic-
tims and (2) by preventing and deterring accidents.' 24
1. Compensation.-With regard to earnings-related compensa-
tion-that is, income replacement for earners-the new Act seems
to provide compensation in about as adequate and timely a fashion
as that provided in the prior Act. For most earners, benefits should
continue to prove very adequate in replacing lost earnings, even
without lump-sum payments for non-economic loss. The plight of
injured non-earners-who have lost the right to receive lump-sums
for non-economic losses-seems on the whole worse than under the
prior Act, notwithstanding the availability of a meager indepen-
dence allowance and limited optional insurance. The well-being of
most victims of medical misadventure is likely to diminish signifi-
cantly compared with their situation under the prior Act: those
claiming medical error may find themselves embroiled in a conten-
tious, if not adversarial, process subject to several appeals, which
may delay their recovery or result in a denial of compensation alto-
gether if fault cannot be proven. Few will qualify to recover under
the highly restricted claim of medical mishap. Finally, with regard
124. Professor Calabresi would refer to these as reducing secondary and primary acci-
dent costs, respectively. GUIDO CALABRESI, THE Cosrs OF ACCIDENTS 26-28 (1970).
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to hospital, medical, and surgical expenses, accident victims will
henceforth face "user part charges" and maximum limits on pay-
ments by the Accident Corporation for private hospitalization,
which could have the effect of reducing victims' access to necessary
health care.
2. Deterrence.-The intention to internalize accident costs is
commendable. Notwithstanding doubts about the effectiveness of
experience rating as a deterrent and its fairness to small firms and
individuals, the possibility that a poor accident record can lead to
higher premiums could reintroduce a greater consciousness of the
need for safety and accident prevention into the national psyche-a
consciousness that in my opinion has diminished since the advent of
the accident compensation scheme. Because of those doubts, how-
ever, it remains to be seen whether and to what extent experience
rating will actually be carried out.
Although the changes to medical misadventure are likely to un-
dermine the comprehensiveness of the accident compensation
scheme, they are, ironically, likely to strengthen considerably deter-
rence and injury prevention in the case of health care professionals,
at least for the near term. Once it is learned that findings of medical
error are to be reported to professional disciplinary bodies and that
determinations of medical error can result in payment of higher pre-
miums, health care professionals can be expected to react by under-
taking greater care in the provision of health services. Indeed, it
would not be a surprise to hear complaints that physicians are be-
ginning to practice "defensive medicine" in order to avoid claims of
medical error. On the other hand, once the weaknesses and ineffec-
tiveness of the scheme-from the point of view of a claimant alleg-
ing medical misadventure-become understood, the deterrent effect
is likely to decline.
Notwithstanding the confusion of principles and the weakness
of deterrence, it is likely that, as to most of its features, the New
Zealand scheme as amended will become even more attractive as a
substitute for the tort system than the former Act. First, workers'
compensation schemes are already in place in most developed na-
tions. Second, the worker-financed nonwork-accident insurance
scheme with employer withholding of premiums seems a relatively
painless way to finance compensation for such injuries. Third, the
total no-fault motor vehicle injury scheme financed by owner premi-
ums and taxes on motor fuel may not appear too radical a departure
in jurisdictions that are familiar with partial motor vehicle no-fault
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schemes. 25 When one adds to this mix the perceived, if illusory,
savings achieved by eliminating all personal liability and liability in-
surance for personal injury, the adoption of the new scheme, includ-
ing even the limited but "free" benefits for non-earners, may appear
very attractive to all but personal injury lawyers and those, like this
commentator, who are concerned about deterrence of accidents and
efficiency. Adoption of such a system outside of New Zealand to
replace an ongoing tort system without provision for a tort liability
back-up would in my opinion be most unfortunate. 26
As to medical misadventure, the fact that New Zealand, the
leading proponent of no-fault accident compensation in the world,
has rejected its own no-fault approach for dealing with medical er-
ror and reintroduced fault-medical negligence-as a basis for com-
pensation, could have a dampening effect on efforts, such as those in
the United States, 27 to replace medical malpractice with a no-fault
system.
125. Quebec has already adopted a total automobile no-fault scheme. See Jeffrey
O'Connell & Charles Tenser, North America's Most Ambitious No-Fault Law: Quebec's Auto
lnsurance Act, 24 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 917 (1987). The study that led to Hawaii's adoption
of a partial no-fault plan for automobile accidents had recommended a "pure" no-fault
scheme. See HALDI ASSOCIATES, INC., A STUDY OF HAWAII'S MOTOR VEHICLE INSURANCE
PROGRAM 119, 127 (1972).
126. See Miller, supra note 9, at 63-80.
127. In Hawaii, for example, a Governor's Blue Ribbon Committee "has made a no-
fault malpractice system . . . one of its top priorities for reining in health care costs."
Kevin Dayton, Doubts on No-Fault in Medicine; Hawaii Doctors, Nurses Skeptical about Changing
System, HONOLULU ADVERTISER, Aug. 28, 1992, at A2. See also American Law Institute
Study, Enterprise Responsibility for Personal Injury, Vol. 1, Approaches to Legal and Institutional
Change 487-516 (1991); PAUL C. WEILER, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ON TRIAL 114-58, 161
(1991) (discussing no-fault for medical injuries and urging further serious
consideration).
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